Abstract:

Cooperation has been widely studied when an individual strategy is adopted against all coplayers. In this context, some extra mechanisms, such as punishment, reward, memory, and network reciprocity must be introduced in order to keep cooperators alive. Here, we adopt a different point of view. We study the adoption of different strategies against different opponents instead of adoption of the same strategy against all of them. In the context of the prisoner dilemma, we consider an evolutionary process in which strategies that provide more benefits are imitated and the players replace the strategy used in one of the interactions furnishing the worst payoff. Individuals are set in a well-mixed population, so that network reciprocity effect is excluded and both synchronous and asynchronous updates are analyzed. As a consequence of the replacement rule, we show that mutual cooperation is never destroyed and the initial fraction of mutual cooperation is a lower bound for the level of cooperation. We show by simulation and mean-field analysis that (i) cooperation dominates for synchronous update and (ii) only the initial mutual cooperation is maintained for asynchronous update. As a side effect of the replacement rule, an ``implicit punishment'' mechanism comes up in a way that exploitations are always neutralized providing evolutionary stability for cooperation.